I. Introduction
Despite the efforts to reform the sovereign debt restructuring process undertaken shall rank equally with all other existing and future unsubordinated and unsecured external indebtedness. How would the sovereign debt community react to these events?
To date, nearly all literature on sovereign debt issues has focused on deterring holdout behavior in foreign bonds restructuring, from a majority voting system to a stay on enforcement. 2 However, these new challenges are likely to shift the attention from holdout behavior to inter-creditor relations, which is considered to be one of the key elements of an effective insolvency law. Key objectives of an effective and efficient insolvency law specified by the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law ("UNCITRAL") Legislative Guide on Insolvency Law include the recognition of existing creditor rights and the establishment of clear rules for ranking of priority claims, and the equitable treatment of similarly situated creditors. See UNCITRAL Legislative Guide on Insolvency Law (2004), available at http://www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/texts/insolven/05-80722_Ebook.pdf (last viewed 11 Mar. 2013), at 11-13. banks, bondholders). 4 Wood studies the priority ladder in national bankruptcy law and reveals an existing de facto priority ladder in the sovereign debt context, which follows the order of super-priority claims such as set-off, security interests and trusts, priority claims such as IMF loans, and pari passu claims. 5 The P. Wood, "Sovereign insolvency: the bankruptcy ladder of priorities and the pari passu clause", supra note 4, at 64. 6 Established by the 1899 and 1907 Conventions for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes, the PCA is an intergovernmental organization that works to facilitate the resolution of international disputes through arbitration and other processes.
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Since 2000, several non-governmental organizations ("NGOs") focused on sovereign debt matters have actively advocated for the establishment of an arbitral tribunal for sovereign debt matters, which would function as an international insolvency court. See Jubilee, "Chapter 9/11? Resolving international debt crises -the Jubilee Framework for international insolvency", Jan. . In response to their proposals, the Netherlands government invited the PCA to initiate a project to promote and facilitate the settlement of disputes arising out of international loan agreements. The interim conclusion of this project also refers to the need to develop substantive legal principles in this respect. See "Arbitration and Sovereign Debt", Paper prepared by the Steering Committee of the Netherlands Government and the Permanent Court of Arbitration, Jul. 11, 2012, at para. 2, available at http://www.slettgjelda.no/filestore/ArbitrationandSovereignDebt.pdf (last viewed 7 Jan. 2013).
"collective" proceeding that would include "all" sovereign debt claims without explaining any reasons for such a vision, partly because this is the form that all national bankruptcy proceedings take. 8 The main purpose of this paper is to take the unusual route of questioning the unquestionable beauty of a collective proceeding for all sovereign debt claims.
This paper is structured as follows: Part II provides an introduction to the context and new developments in sovereign debt restructurings. Part III analyses inter-creditor issues in sovereign debt restructurings with a focus on the concept and status quo. In exploring solutions to inter-creditor issues, Part IV starts with a summary of the existing proposals relating to inter-creditor issues and moves on to discuss the appropriateness of a collective proceeding for all claims. First, the author argues that the automatic acceleration principle in national bankruptcy law should not apply to the sovereign debt context because of the "temporary" nature of the sovereign debt crisis, the "alive" feature of the limited pool of sovereign assets and the "non-liquidable" fact of the sovereign debtor. Second, the author argues that a collective proceeding is not the most desirable form of proceeding due to the absence of the common pool problem in the context of sovereign debt and the incomparably different natures of multilateral/bilateral claims that renders the design of a priority order between multilateral/bilateral claims and commercial claims impossible. Part V concludes this paper.
II. Sovereign Debt Restructurings
A.
The Context
The current practice of sovereign lending and borrowing is unprecedented. For two centuries, sovereign debtors borrowed from one or more, but not all, of the following 8 C. sources: commercial banks, bondholders, governments and multilateral institutions. It was not until the early 1990s that all four types of creditors began to play an active role in the sovereign debt market. 9 While commercial banks and bondholders form the "private sector" creditor group, the "public sector" creditor group is composed of governments ("bilateral creditors") and multilateral institutions such as the IMF, the World Bank and other regional banks (collectively, "multilateral creditors").
With debt comes the possibility of default, and sovereigns are no exception to this axiom. At present, there is no international insolvency regime governing sovereign debt defaults, comprised of rules designed to cope with the scenario in which creditors cannot be fully satisfied. Instead, sovereign debt defaults are dealt with using an ad hoc, individual case-by-case approach in which most rules are invented along the way. In practice, in order to avoid an eternal default, the sovereign debtor is compelled to seek debt relief from creditors before or shortly after the eve of default, via an extension of maturity, and/or a reduction of the value of the claim. Such relief is obtained by renegotiating the relevant debt instruments with individual creditors. The rationale for renegotiation is that all participants in the sovereign borrowing and lending activities, both debtor and creditors, should share the risk of insolvency. ("SDRM"). 13 The key feature of the SDRM is a majority voting system, which binds all creditors to a restructuring agreement that has been accepted by a qualified majority.
14 Whereas this proposal was eventually shelved due to a lack of sufficient support from the IMF member States 15 , the idea of a majority voting system survived. Collective Action
Clauses ("CACs"), a contractual approach to implementing a majority voting system, gained broad support from market participants and sovereign debtors. . 17 The pari passu clause in dispute provided that securities shall at all times rank pari passu, and that the Argentina's payment obligations under the bonds shall at all times rank equally at least equally with all its other present and future unsecured and unsubordinated securities. The appellant court explained that the clause protected against two different forms of discrimination: the issuance of other superior debt and the giving of priority to other payment obligations. It affirmed the injunctions issued by the trial court that requires Argentina to make ratable payments to plaintiffs concurrent with or in advance of its payments to holders of old bonds, and asked the trial court to further clarify how does the payment formula in the injunction intend to operate. The trial court clarified, in a subsequent order issued on 21 November 2012, that the payment formula in the injunction is intended to operate as follows: whenever Argentina pays any amount due under the terms of the exchange bonds, it must concurrently or in advance pay plaintiffs the same percentage of the amount due to them. reality that sovereign lending activities are not risk-free and that they may have to take a loss. It is often said that, in the time of crisis, creditors should make "contributions" to help the debtor recover. Given that the total amount of contribution needed by the debtor to recover from the crisis is certain, the fact that a particular creditor makes a lesser contribution means that other creditors must make a larger one.
Therefore, as soon as the news of the debtor's financial distress spreads, creditors immediately want to find out who the other creditors are, whether they will be willing to make contributions and how large these might be. This change of attitude towards other creditors is referred to as the "conflict of interest issue among creditors" or "inter-creditor issues".
B.
The Status Quo
Treatment within the same group
As far as the public sector is concerned, multilateral and bilateral creditors enjoy In the private sector, commercial banks and bondholders all enjoy equal treatment within their groups but to a different extent. Commercial banks have employed the 29 E. Cosio-Pascal, supra note 10, at 12. 30 Ibid., at 13.
"mandatory repayment clause", which requires pro rata payments to all lenders in the event of a prepayment to any lender. 31 This clause excludes certain categories of claims, such as IMF debt, trade debt, foreign exchange contract obligations, interest and other agreed categories. 32 In addition, certain bank syndications also contain the "pro rata sharing clause", which provides that any bank receiving a greater proportion of its share must pay the excess to the agent bank who then redistributes to all banks on a pro rata basis. 33 The purpose of this clause is to share individual receipts, such as receipts by setoff, proceeds of litigation, individual guarantees or direct payments by the debtor.
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Private bondholders have over the years expanded the use of the "pari passu clause" in the bond contracts, which provides, in part, that the bonds of that particular issue shall rank equally among themselves. 36 Ibid., at 34. M. Wright, supra note 31, at 6. of bonds the negative pledge generally only applies to security for bonds and other debt that is capable of being listed or traded on a market. 37 Besides ensuring the equal ranking of all bonds of that particular issue, the "pari passu clause" in most bond contracts also provides, in its second part, that the debtor's payment obligation under that particular issue shall rank equally with all other existing and future unsubordinated and unsecured external indebtedness. 38 On many occasions, the pari passu treatment in bond contracts is further limited to other bonds and tradable debt instruments. 39 Over the past decade, the pari passu clause has become a litigation tool for bondholders who refused to accept the exchange offer, and the meaning of this clause has always remained controversial. 40 A narrow interpretation of this clause holds that all claims legally rank equally; in contrast, a wider interpretation suggests that the debtor must pay all its creditors ratably. 41 Global Law Intelligence Unit, Allen & Overy LL.P, supra note 17, at 8. 42 Those actions included executive-declared moratoriums on payments on the old bonds which had been renewed each year, the fact that Argentina had not made a single payment on the old bonds for six years while timely servicing the new bonds, that Argentina enacted the Lock Law and that Argentina had stated in the prospectuses for the new bonds that it had no intention of making any payments on the old bonds and classified the old bonds as a separate category from the new bonds in its SEC filings. Ibid., at 11.
that the plaintiffs had not argued that preferential payments to the IMF made by Argentina could similarly entitle the plaintiffs to rateable payments. 43 Nevertheless, what is clear is that the history of the pari passu clause indicates that its introduction was intended, at least in part, as a tool for preserving inter-creditor equity and fairness in negotiations. 44 b. Creditor policies
In the 1980s, commercial banks routinely imposed conditions for the restructuring of their loans, which involved a corresponding restructuring of the Paris Club debt. 45 Paris Club members have actively advocated that a sovereign debtor may not accept less debt relief from its non-Paris Club creditors than the amount agreed with the Paris Club.
This is referred to as the comparability of treatment principle. 46 The principle, in essence, forbids other creditors from making a lesser contribution than Paris Club creditorsalthough the Club considers certain mitigating factors to justify a deviation from the principle. 47 A controversial issue arises with respect to the willingness of Paris Club members to contribute proportionally when other creditor groups make larger contributions. 48 However, it is worth noting that the Paris Club considers on a case-bycase basis whether mitigating factors exist to justify a deviation from the comparability of treatment principle in respect of a particular creditor or debt instrument-although no explanation is provided as to what the "mitigating" factors entail.
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IV. Exploring Solutions to Inter-creditor Issues
A. Existing Proposals
Proposals in favor of a legal framework for sovereign debt workouts advanced by both economists and legal scholars started to emerge in the 1980s. 50 Notably, not all proposals focus on inter-creditor issues in sovereign debt workouts. The IMF's famous SDRM proposal, for instance, identifies the range of claims that could potentially be restructured under the mechanism, but leaves it to the debtor to decide which subset of eligible claims would need to be restructured in a particular case. 51 It nevertheless mentions that debt owed to an international organization could not be restructured under the SDRM; 52 the claims of official bilateral creditors would be excluded from the SDRM or, alternatively, restructured within the SDRM as a separate class. 53 This section summarizes the discussion of inter-creditor issues in recent proposals.
Soft law approach
According to Gelpern, inter-creditor issues could be addressed by allowing the sovereign debtor to impose priority rules on creditors unilaterally or by contract, to disclose the rankings at the time of borrowing and to comply with its commitments. 54 This proposal gives international financial institutions, like the IMF, a role in monitoring the sovereign debtor's compliance with such obligations. Amongst other things, the IMF could report whether the priorities States disclose in advance are consistent with the "general principles for according priority agreed among the official sector, the borrowers, and the private creditors". 55 In case of any violation, creditors would follow the old path of suing the sovereign debtor in national courts. with new financing and those holding trade credits. 63 The non-governmental organization German Debt Network (Erlassjahr) followed a similar approach. Its proposal states that in principle all creditors need to be treated equally, and preferred creditor status can only be granted by mutual consent. 64 It emphasizes "all claims on a sovereign need to be treated in one single process". 65 Paulus discussed the current "sectoral treatment of creditors" in sovereign debt workouts and emphasized the need for "a comprehensive solution". 66 To that end, Paulus advocated "an all-encompassing resolvency proceeding all claims should be included" 67 and envisaged a single forum. 68 His proposal suggests that different creditor groups could be treated differently and allows small creditors be packed into a separate group receiving full payment while other groups, such as institutionalized creditors, take haircuts. 69 Bolton and Skeel addressed issues concerning the ranking for unsecured sovereign debt and proposed a "first-in-time" rule. According to this rule, when a sovereign debtor files for debt restructuring, "all unsecured debt would be classified by date of issue and earlier issues would have higher priority over later issues". 70 In order to avoid the creation of too many classes, they suggested that either each class must be of "a minimum size in value relative to the total value of outstanding debt" or "issues within
any given fiscal year" should be put together in a single class. 71 Schwarcz drafted a Model Sovereign Debt Convention dealing with the sovereign debt restructuring process. Art. 6 of the Model Convention states that a debt restructuring plan shall designate classes of claims in accordance with Art. 7(3), specify the proposed treatment of each class and provide the same treatment for the same class. 72 Art. 7(3)
provides that each class shall consist of claims against the sovereign debtor that are pari passu in priority, "provided that (a) pari passu claims need not all be included in the same class, and (b) claims of governmental or multigovernmental entities each shall be classed separately". 73 Art. 4 of the Model Convention requires the sovereign debtor to "notify all of its known creditors of its intention to negotiate a [p]lan under this Convention". 74 Similarly, Dickerson's proposal also requires the sovereign debtor to notify all creditors, disclose all claims, and explain the intended treatment of those claims. 75 It expresses the need to "ensure that all claims will be dealt with in an efficient, predictable, collective proceeding". 
Observations
It appears from the proposals discussed above that inter-creditor issues in sovereign debt workouts are far from being settled. To begin with, not all proposals touch upon issues concerning the ranking of different claims. Among those that discuss the ranking issue, most of them address it in a rather ambiguous way. for a similar conclusion. In this respect, it is observed that the issue of whether a collective proceeding including all claims is the appropriate forum for sovereign debt workouts has never attracted attention in any proposal. These proposals either take a collective proceeding for all claims for granted without explaining any reason for this, or discuss directly issues involved in a collective proceeding including all claims (i.e. claim classification), thereby assuming the appropriateness of such a process. The paragraphs below intend to fill this gap by exploring the reasons behind a collective proceeding for all claims in national bankruptcy law and the rationale for borrowing (or not) such a concept for discussions concerning a legal framework for sovereign debt restructuring.
B. Treatment of All or Partial Claims
Creditors affected by inter-creditor issues
As mentioned above, inter-creditor issues are caused by the conflict of interests among creditors. The reason for such a conflict lies with a limited pool of assets that is insufficient for everyone's satisfaction so that creditors have to take a loss and contribute to the debtor's recovery. It is widely accepted that a lesser contribution made by any individual creditor requires that other creditors contribute more. However, this theory only makes sense in the situation of a still pool.
By contrast, in the context of sovereign debt, the debtor can always raise revenue through taxation. Therefore, the pool of assets, although limited, is not still but alive. In other words, the pool is dynamic, with money going in and out on a daily basis. In addition, a sovereign State can never be liquidated, thus rendering the crisis merely temporary. Indeed, because the State will ultimately recover, the pool here will never become still. In a still pool, the interests of all creditors are conflicted. By contrast, where the pool of assets is constantly replenished, the ability of individual creditors to make a lesser contribution does not necessarily require other creditors to contribute more. 77 The conflict of interest exists only during the temporary period when there are not enough assets for everyone. During this period, the concerned creditors are those holding claims with maturities before the end of the crisis period. Taking Greece as an example, the financial crisis is severe but will eventually end in X years. Thus, a conflict of interest exists only among creditors holding claims with maturities in the next X years. It follows that inter-creditor issues are only relevant for creditors holding claims that will mature in the next X years. Therefore, any rules designed to address inter-creditor issues should not include all claims.
Because the task of identifying "X" is extremely complex, if not impossible, the practical solution is to allow the debtor to determine its anticipated date of recovery from 77 It is argued that taking assets out of a live pool does not necessarily lead to a situation where fewer assets are available for other creditors, provided that the debtor can coordinate the rate at which assets increase, relative to the rate at which assets are attached by creditors. See S. Block-Lieb, "Fishing in Muddy Waters: Clarifying the Common Pool Analogy As Applied to the Standard for Commencement of a Bankruptcy Case", 42 Am. U. L. Rev. 337 (1993) , at 381. the crisis, after considering the debt sustainability analysis provided by international financial institutions. Giving the debtor the freedom to determine X will not be problematic, as it only intends to address the conflict of interests among creditors, but not to make the restructuring process necessarily easier for the debtor.
Inappropriateness of the automatic acceleration principle
Needless to say, the proposal that inter-creditor issues only exist among creditors holding claims with maturities in the next X years challenges the basic principle of national bankruptcy law that all claims become due upon the filing of bankruptcy ("automatic acceleration principle"). Different national bankruptcy legislations may use different terms for this principle, but it basically refers to the situation that all claims are allowed in a bankruptcy proceeding regardless of the maturity date. The author argues that this principle should not be applied to any future legal framework for sovereign debt restructurings for the reasons outlined below.
First, the rationale for this basic principle derives from the liquidation scenario, and should not be applied to sovereign States where liquidation is not a possibility. In liquidation, the company will eventually be liquidated and dissolved; thus, all creditors must be able to make their claims immediately instead of years later, according to the maturity date. 78 This principle makes sense under the contract law theory that the debtor's repayment obligations cannot be assigned to a new entity without the creditor's permission unless the original debtor remains responsible. 79 It is argued that, from a contract law perspective, the continuation of a debtor's contractual obligation beyond its liquidation is equivalent to a delegation of that obligation to a new entity. 80 However, because the original debtor does not exist beyond liquidation, such a delegation of the repayment obligation is prohibited, and all claims become due and payable immediately.
The principle also applies in reorganization on the basis that a company may still be 78 T. Jackson, "Determining Liabilities and the Basic Role of Nonbankruptcy Law", Chapter 2 in The Logic and Limits of Bankruptcy Law (1986, Harvard), at 38. 79 Ibid. 80 Ibid.
liquidated if the reorganization plans fail. 81 In the absence of any possibility of liquidation, the principle that all claims are automatically accelerated simply should not apply to sovereign States. However, this rule would not affect creditors' ability to accelerate claims pursuant to the terms of the debt contract.
Second, the fact that the U.S. municipal bankruptcy law 82 does not differentiate between the municipal debtor and other types of debtors on this point does not mean that the automatic acceleration principle is appropriate for States. The principle that all claims with different maturity dates are allowed in a domestic bankruptcy proceeding is to be found in the definition of "claim" contained in the general provisions of the U.S. Accordingly, the bonds with the longest maturity (2057) will actually be paid before they become due (2042); the present value haircut implicit in the restructuring for this bond was -26.5. 87 This negative figure indicates that these bondholders suffered no loss at all; instead, their positions improved through the inclusion of their claims in the restructuring process. This finding contradicts the theory that the inclusion of all creditors in the bankruptcy proceeding necessarily contributes to the broadest possible relief for the debtor.
To summarize, the author argues that the "temporary" nature of a sovereign debt crisis and an "alive" pool of sovereign assets put the fundamental principle of automatic acceleration adopted from national bankruptcy law in doubt. An analysis of the underlying reasons for such a principle further demonstrates its inappropriateness for sovereign debtors. Therefore, any future rules for inter-creditor issues should not address all sovereign debt claims, but only those claims which are relevant.
C. Collective or Non-collective Proceeding
Need for a collective proceeding in national bankruptcy law
The need for a collective proceeding in national bankruptcy law is justified by two main theories-the common pool problem and the creditors' bargain theory.
Scholars describe the creditors of a debtor with a limited pool of assets not enough for everyone as enmeshed in a common pool problem. 88 They compare the debtor's assets to a jointly-owned pool of fish, and the debtor's creditors to self-interested fishermen. They view the creditors' pursuit of their remedies in terms of attachment, garnishment, execution and levy as analogous to the overfishing of a common pool: self-interested creditors have every incentive to collect as many of the debtor's assets as quickly as they can, because the creditors who are first to collect suffer none of the deleterious effects of their collection actions. 89 With this observation they make a powerful case for the need for some form of a collective bankruptcy remedy.
Moreover, the creditors' bargain theory holds that it is in the creditors' best interest to agree ex ante on binding collective procedural rules. The argument is that unsecured creditors prefer a collective system that treats them alike, because it reduces the costs associated with individual creditors' actions, increases the aggregate pool of assets and avoids a piecemeal dismantling of a debtor's business, as well as enhances administrative efficiencies. 91 However, fully secured creditors are not direct beneficiaries of any of these advantages, because they can easily remove the collateral from the debtor's estate. 92 Thus, unsecured creditors have a strong interest in including secured creditors in the collective proceeding, in order to prevent actions by them that diminish the aggregate estate. 93 Unsecured creditors are therefore willing to give secured creditors at least some benefit in exchange for their agreement to join in the collective proceeding.
Secured creditors have no reason to object to inclusion if left as well off as before. 94 The result is a collective system that includes both secured and unsecured creditors, with the rights of secured creditors preserved through a priority position in the order for the distribution of assets.
Absence of the need for a collective proceeding in the sovereign debt context
To begin with, the so-called common pool problem does not exist in the sovereign debt context. Litigation against a sovereign debtor in national courts is not an easy undertaking. Sovereign debt creditors holding a favorable judgment may still encounter problems with enforcement. Whereas attempts to attach property in the sovereign debtor's territory may face objections based on public policy, efforts to enforce the judgment abroad may fail due to the sovereign's lack of attachable assets in foreign countries and the principle that certain assets located abroad cannot be attached due to their special characteristics (i.e. diplomatic missions, central bank reserves, military assets etc.). 95 Due to these difficulties and uncertainties, the number of court litigation against sovereign debtors is relatively small. Turning to the creditors' bargain theory, as discussed above a collective proceeding is only desirable when it is in the best interests of both unsecured and secured creditors, and secured creditors would only agree to be included in the same proceeding as unsecured creditor if their rights are well preserved through priority rules. In the sovereign debt world, however, whether creditors are secured or not is not a major difference between them as a result of the negative pledge clause which restricts the debtor's ability to grant security interests in its property to secure other creditors. One unique feature of the sovereign debt context is the involvement of multilateral and bilateral creditors. While commercial creditors lend for profit, multilateral and bilateral creditor lend for a wide variety of purposes, except making a profit. The rationale for multilateral lending relates to information provision in terms of monitoring government policies in recipient countries and the exercise of conditionality aimed at changing 96 Schumacher et al., supra note 22. 97 Ibid., at 3. 98 Ibid.
governmental policies. 99 Similarly, bilateral creditors often extended to advance political and social objectives, such as ensuring that domestic exporters are not disadvantaged by financial support offered by other governments, or sharing the costs of building infrastructure projects that can help the debtor achieve higher rates of economic growth. 100 Given the non-comparable differences between multilateral/bilateral creditors and commercial creditors, it seems extremely difficult, if not impossible, to weigh political and financial considerations and to devise a priority order between them. Such difficulty is acknowledged in the sovereign debt framework proposals put forward by the IMF and Schwarcz, in which the term "separate" is used to describe the treatment for multilateral and/or bilateral creditors. 101 Importantly, separate treatment does not necessarily violate the equitable treatment principle in national bankruptcy law, which basically ensures the fair treatment of creditors with similar legal rights so that assets are distributed according to the creditors' ranking. 102 That is, all creditors do not need to be treated equally, but "in a manner that reflects the different bargains they have struck with the debtor". 103 In light of the foregoing, the author argues that a collective proceeding is not the most desirable form of proceeding due to the absence of the common pool problem in the context of sovereign debt and the incomparably different nature of multilateral/bilateral claims that renders the design of a priority order between multilateral/bilateral claims and commercial claims impossible. In the view of the author, the inapplicability of a collective proceeding offers two possibilities: several separate collective proceedings or a non-collective proceeding. Whereas collectivity is considered to be the easiest way to ensure equal treatment, a similar result can arguably be achieved through the implementation of mandatory rules to the same effect and legal sanctions against violation of these rules. The ultimate choice largely depends on an analysis evaluating the benefits and costs involved for collective proceedings within a smaller circle.
V. Conclusion
In light of recent creditor episodes, the NML Capital Ltd. decision in particular, the time for academic attention to shift from holdout concerns to inter-creditor issues has become ripe. This paper details the concept and status quo of inter-creditor issues in sovereign debt restructurings and explores possible solutions to inter-creditor issues.
Notably, it questions the unquestionable beauty of a "collective" proceeding for "all" sovereign debt claims.
With respect to "all" claims, this paper identifies the scope of creditors affected by inter-creditor issues by discussing the "temporary" nature of the sovereign debt crisis and the "alive" feature of the limited pool of sovereign assets. It maintains that where the pool of assets is constantly replenished, inter-creditor issues do not concern all creditors because the ability of individual creditors to make a lesser contribution does not necessarily require other creditors to contribute more. To further support this argument, the paper discusses the reasons for non-applicability of the automatic acceleration principle in national bankruptcy law in the sovereign debt context through its analysis of the non-liquidable nature of sovereign debtors and the legislative motivation for the adoption of the automatic acceleration principle for municipal debtors in U.S. chapter 9 bankruptcy.
Turning to a "collective" proceeding, this paper explains the theories in favor of such a proceeding in national bankruptcy law, namely, the common pool problem and the creditor's bargain theory. It uses empirical data concerning the number of litigation against sovereign debtors in the U.S. and UK courts between 1976 and 2010 to argue that the common pool problem does not exist in the sovereign debt context. Moreover, it explains that, according to the creditor's bargain theory, a collective proceeding is only desirable when it is in the best interests of both unsecured and secured creditors, and that 28 secured creditors would only agree to be included in the same proceeding as unsecured creditors if their rights are well preserved through priority rules. It analyses the incomparably different nature of multilateral/bilateral claims and argues that it is almost impossible to weigh political and financial considerations and to devise a priority order between multilateral/bilateral claims and commercial claims. Therefore, multilateral/bilateral claims and commercial claims should receive separate treatment and
should not be included in a collective proceeding.
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